On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
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Dosyalar
Tarih
2013-05
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Özet
In this paper, we investigate domains that admit "well-behaved" strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982) [13]. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Strategy-proofness, Restricted domains, Semi-single-peaked domains
Kaynak
Journal of Economic Theory
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
