Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
dc.authorid | Ozdemir, Ugur/0000-0001-6736-7008; | |
dc.authorwosid | Ozdemir, Ugur/AAW-9738-2020 | |
dc.authorwosid | Sanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019 | |
dc.contributor.author | Ozdemir, Ugur | |
dc.contributor.author | Sanver, M. Remzi | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-18T20:40:27Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-07-18T20:40:27Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.department | İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | We call a domain of preference orderings dictatorial if there exists no Arrovian (Pareto optimal, IIA and non-dictatorial) social welfare function defined over that domain. In a finite world of alternatives where indifferences are ruled out, we identify a condition which implies the dictatoriality of a domain. This condition, to which we refer as being essentially saturated, is fairly weak. In fact, independent of the number of alternatives, there exists an essentially saturated ( hence dictatorial) domain which consists of precisely six orderings. Moreover, this domain exhibits the superdictatoriality property, i.e., every superdomain of it is also dictatorial. Thus, given m alternatives, the ratio of the size of a superdictatorial domain to the size of the full domain may be as small as 6/m!, converging to zero as m increases. | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00355-006-0154-7 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 76 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0176-1714 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1432-217X | |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-33751087188 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusquality | Q1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.startpage | 61 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0154-7 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7118 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 28 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000243378900004 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wosquality | Q3 | en_US |
dc.indekslendigikaynak | Web of Science | en_US |
dc.indekslendigikaynak | Scopus | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Social Choice and Welfare | en_US |
dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Social-Welfare Functions | en_US |
dc.subject | Voting Procedures | en_US |
dc.subject | Majority-Rule | en_US |
dc.subject | Strategy | en_US |
dc.subject | Existence | en_US |
dc.subject | Theorems | en_US |
dc.subject | Private | en_US |
dc.title | Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |