Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation

dc.authoridOzdemir, Ugur/0000-0001-6736-7008;
dc.authorwosidOzdemir, Ugur/AAW-9738-2020
dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorOzdemir, Ugur
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M. Remzi
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:27Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:27Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe call a domain of preference orderings dictatorial if there exists no Arrovian (Pareto optimal, IIA and non-dictatorial) social welfare function defined over that domain. In a finite world of alternatives where indifferences are ruled out, we identify a condition which implies the dictatoriality of a domain. This condition, to which we refer as being essentially saturated, is fairly weak. In fact, independent of the number of alternatives, there exists an essentially saturated ( hence dictatorial) domain which consists of precisely six orderings. Moreover, this domain exhibits the superdictatoriality property, i.e., every superdomain of it is also dictatorial. Thus, given m alternatives, the ratio of the size of a superdictatorial domain to the size of the full domain may be as small as 6/m!, converging to zero as m increases.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-006-0154-7
dc.identifier.endpage76en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.issn1432-217X
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-33751087188en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage61en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0154-7
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7118
dc.identifier.volume28en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000243378900004en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ3en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfareen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectSocial-Welfare Functionsen_US
dc.subjectVoting Proceduresen_US
dc.subjectMajority-Ruleen_US
dc.subjectStrategyen_US
dc.subjectExistenceen_US
dc.subjectTheoremsen_US
dc.subjectPrivateen_US
dc.titleDictatorial domains in preference aggregationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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