Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2007
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We call a domain of preference orderings dictatorial if there exists no Arrovian (Pareto optimal, IIA and non-dictatorial) social welfare function defined over that domain. In a finite world of alternatives where indifferences are ruled out, we identify a condition which implies the dictatoriality of a domain. This condition, to which we refer as being essentially saturated, is fairly weak. In fact, independent of the number of alternatives, there exists an essentially saturated ( hence dictatorial) domain which consists of precisely six orderings. Moreover, this domain exhibits the superdictatoriality property, i.e., every superdomain of it is also dictatorial. Thus, given m alternatives, the ratio of the size of a superdictatorial domain to the size of the full domain may be as small as 6/m!, converging to zero as m increases.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Social-Welfare Functions, Voting Procedures, Majority-Rule, Strategy, Existence, Theorems, Private
Kaynak
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
28
Sayı
1
