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Öğe A characterization of the Copeland solution(2010-06) Sanver, Mert RemziDaha fazla We show that the Copeland solution is equivalent to the minisum principle which requires to choose the candidate(s) who beat all remaining contenders in the smallest total number of steps. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.Daha fazla Öğe Compromise Rules Revisited(SPRINGER, 2019-02-15) Özkal Sanver, İpek; Merlin, Vincent; Sanver, Mert RemziDaha fazla Decision makers often face a dilemma when they have to arbitrate between the quantity of support for a decision (i.e., the number of people who back it) and the quality of support (i.e., at which level to go down in voters’ preferences to obtain sufficient level of support). The trade-off between the quality and quantity of support behind alternatives led to numerous suggestions in social choice theory: without being exhaustive we can mention Majoritarian Compromise, Fallback Bargaining, Set of Efficient Compromises, Condorcet Practical Method, Median Voting Rule, Majority Judgement. Our point is that all these concepts share a common feature which enables us to gather them in the same class, the class of compromise rules, which are all based upon elementary scoring rules described extensively by Saari. One can exploit his results to analyze the compromise rules with relative ease, which is a major point of our paper.Daha fazla Öğe A minimax procedure for electing committees(2007-09) Sanver, Mert RemziDaha fazla A new voting procedure for electing committees, called the minimax procedure, is described. Based on approval balloting, it chooses the committee that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance to voters' ballots, where these ballots are weighted by their proximity to other voters' ballots. This minimax outcome may be diametrically opposed to the outcome obtained by aggregating approval votes in the usual manner, which minimizes the sum of the Hamming distances and is called the minisum outcome. The manipulability of these procedures, and their applicability when election outcomes are restricted in various ways, are also investigated. The minimax procedure is applied to the 2003 Game Theory Society election of a council of 12 new members from a list of 24 candidates. By rendering outlying voters less influential and not antagonizing any voters too much, it arguably would have produced a committee more representative of the interests of all voters than the minisum committee that was elected. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.Daha fazla Öğe Sophisticated preference aggregation(2009-06) Sanver, Mert RemziDaha fazla A Sophisticated Social Welfare Function (SSWF) is a mapping from profiles of individual preferences into a sophisticated preference which is a pairwise weighted comparison of alternatives. We characterize Pareto optimal and pairwise independent SSWFs in terms of oligarchies that are induced by some power distribution in the society. This is a fairly large class ranging from dictatoriality to anonymous aggregation rules. Our results generalize the impossibility theorem of Arrow (Social choice and individual values. Wiley, New York, 1951) and the oligarchy theorem of Gibbard (Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma, University of Chicago, unpublished manuscript, 1969). © 2008 Springer-Verlag.Daha fazla Öğe The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights(Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2015-03) Aşan, Göksel; Sanver, Mert RemziDaha fazla We consider the problem of producing an impure public good in various jurisdictions formed through the strategic decisions of agents. Our environment inherits two well-known problems: (i) Under individual decisions, there is a tension between stability and efficiency; (ii) Under coalitional decisions, stable jurisdiction structures may fail to exist. The solution, we propose is the use of membership property rights: When a move among jurisdictions is subject to the approval of the agents whom it affects, coalitionally stable jurisdiction structures coincide with those which are efficient. © 2014, Springer Science+Business Media New York.Daha fazla