The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights
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Date
2015-03
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Access Rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Abstract
We consider the problem of producing an impure public good in various jurisdictions formed through the strategic decisions of agents. Our environment inherits two well-known problems: (i) Under individual decisions, there is a tension between stability and efficiency; (ii) Under coalitional decisions, stable jurisdiction structures may fail to exist. The solution, we propose is the use of membership property rights: When a move among jurisdictions is subject to the approval of the agents whom it affects, coalitionally stable jurisdiction structures coincide with those which are efficient. © 2014, Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Description
Keywords
Coalition formation, Impure public goods, Membership property rights, Tiebout hypothesis, Decision theory, Coalition formations, Membership property rights, Public goods, Strategic decisions, Tiebout, Decision support systems
Journal or Series
Theory and Decision
WoS Q Value
Q2
