Efficiency in the degree of compromise

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dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorÖzkal-Sanver, I
dc.contributor.authorSanver, MR
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:56:56Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:56:56Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a social choice axiom called efficiency in the degree of compromise. Our axiom is based on the trade-off between the quantity and quality of support that an alternative receives. What we mean by the quantity of support is the number of voters behind an alternative, while the quality of support is about the definition of being behind depending on the rank of an alternative in voters' preference orderings. Naturally, one can increase the quantity of support of an alternative to the expense of giving up from its quality. We say that an alternative is an efficient compromise if there exists no other alternative with at least an equal quantity of support with a higher quality. Our efficient compromise axiom is based on not choosing inefficient compromises. We introduce it and show that many standard social choice rules of the literature, such as Condorcet-consistent rules, plurality with a runoff, the Borda count and the single transferable vote, may choose inefficient compromises.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1023/B:GRUP.0000042925.01972.ad
dc.identifier.endpage380en_US
dc.identifier.issn0926-2644
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.startpage375en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1023/B:GRUP.0000042925.01972.ad
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/8908
dc.identifier.volume13en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000224099300005en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ2en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherKluwer Academic Publen_US
dc.relation.ispartofGroup Decision and Negotiationen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectEfficient Compromiseen_US
dc.subjectMajoritarian Compromiseen_US
dc.subjectFallback Bargainingen_US
dc.subjectCondorceten_US
dc.subjectPluralityen_US
dc.subjectPlurality With A Runoffen_US
dc.subjectBordaen_US
dc.subjectSingle Transferable Voteen_US
dc.titleEfficiency in the degree of compromise
dc.typeArticle

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