Compromise in combinatorial vote

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dc.authoridDindar, Hayrullah/0000-0001-6724-2045|LAINE, Jean/0000-0002-7305-7556
dc.contributor.authorDindar, Hayrullah
dc.contributor.authorLaine, Jean
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:37Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:37Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider collective choice problems where the set of social outcomes is a Cartesian product of finitely many finite sets. Each individual is assigned a two-level preference, defined as a pair involving a vector of strict rankings of elements in each of the sets and a strict ranking of social outcomes. A voting rule is called (resp. weakly) product stable at some two-level preference profile if every (resp. at least one) outcome formed by separate coordinate-wise choices is also an outcome of the rule applied to preferences over social outcomes. We investigate the (weak) product stability for the specific class of compromise solutions involving q-approval rules, where q lies between 1 and the number I of voters. Given a finite set X and a profile of I linear orders over X, a q-approval rule selects elements of X that gathers the largest support above q at the highest rank in the profile. Well-known q-approval rules are the Fallback Bargaining solution (q = I) and the Majoritarian Compromise (q = [I/2]). We assume that coordinate-wise rankings and rankings of social out- comes are related in a neutral way, and we investigate the existence of neutral twolevel preference domains that ensure the weak product stability of q-approval rules. We show that no such domain exists unless either q = I or very special cases prevail. Moreover, we characterize the neutral two-level preference domains over which the Fallback Bargaining solution is weakly product stable.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipBILGI Research Development Innovation Programme, POlarization viewed from SOcial choice Perspective (POSOP)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipAuthors are grateful to two reviewers and the associate editor for their valuable comments and suggestions. This research has been partially funded by the BILGI Research Development Innovation Programme, POlarization viewed from SOcial choice Perspective (POSOP).en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-022-01387-6
dc.identifier.endpage206en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.issn1432-217X
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85124763016en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage175en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01387-6
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7133
dc.identifier.volume59en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000755388600001en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfareen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectOstrogorski Paradoxen_US
dc.subjectPreference Aggregationen_US
dc.subjectTheoremen_US
dc.titleCompromise in combinatorial vote
dc.typeArticle

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