A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2009
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
A social choice hyperfunction picks a non-empty set of alternatives at each admissible preference profile over sets of alternatives. We analyze the manipulability of social choice hyperfunctions. We identify a domain D-lambda of lexicographic orderings which exhibits an impossibility of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite type. Moreover, this impossibility is inherited by all well-known superdomains of D-lambda. As most of the standard extension axioms induce superdomains of D-lambda while social choice correspondences are particular social choice hyperfunctions, we are able to generalize many impossibility results in the literature. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Strategy-Proofness, Manipulation, Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, Social Choice Correspondences, Hyperfunctions, Manipulation, Correspondences
Kaynak
Games and Economic Behavior
WoS Q Değeri
Q2
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
66
Sayı
2
