Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2009
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
The Ostrogorski paradox refers to the fact that, facing finitely many dichotomous issues, choosing issue-wise according to the majority rule may lead to a majority defeated overall outcome. This paper investigates the possibility for a similar paradox to occur under alternative specifications of the collective preference relation. The generalized Ostrogorski paradox occurs when the issue-wise majority rule leads to an outcome which is not maximal according to some binary relation phi defined over pairs of alternatives. We focus on three possible definitions of phi, whose sets of maximal elements are respectively the Uncovered Set, the Top-Cycle, and the Pareto Set. We prove that a generalized paradox may prevail for the Uncovered Set. Moreover, it may be avoided for the same issue-wise majority margins as for the Ostrogorski paradox. However, the issue-wise majority rule always selects a Pareto-optimal alternative in the Top-Cycle.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Multiple Elections, Aggregating Sets, Anscombe Paradox, Majority, Correspondences, Tournaments, Preferences, Committees, Judgments
Kaynak
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
32
Sayı
2
