Nash implementation of the majority rule

dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M. Remzi
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:42:32Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:42:32Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractGiven a society confronting two alternatives, we show that the absolute majority rule is the minimal Nash implementable extension of the relative majority rule. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2005.12.018
dc.identifier.endpage372en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.issn1873-7374
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-33646814420en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage369en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.12.018
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7323
dc.identifier.volume91en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000238407600011en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Science Saen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Lettersen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectMajority Ruleen_US
dc.subjectMaskin Monotonicityen_US
dc.subjectMinimal Monotonic Extensionsen_US
dc.subjectNash İmplementationen_US
dc.titleNash implementation of the majority ruleen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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