Minimally strategy-proof rank aggregation

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dc.authorid0000-0002-7305-7556
dc.authorid0000-0001-6724-2045
dc.contributor.authorDindar, Hayrullah
dc.contributor.authorDogan, Onur
dc.contributor.authorLaine, Jean
dc.date.accessioned2026-04-04T18:55:21Z
dc.date.available2026-04-04T18:55:21Z
dc.date.issued2025
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi
dc.description.abstractA rank aggregation rule aggregates finitely many linear orderings of objects to a collective linear ordering of these objects. We consider the robustness of rank aggregation methods to manipulation by misrepresentation of some individual order. This requires formulating assumptions about how individuals compare orders. Betweenness is a natural assumption for rank aggregation rules interpreted as Arrowian aggregation rules, which maps every family of individual preferences over social alternatives to a collective preference over those alternatives. However, many rank aggregation rules do not relate to the classical preference aggregation problem, and call for different assumptions. Instead of focusing on specific assumptions, we only assume that individuals compare orders by means of an order extension, which maps every linear order p over objects to a linear order over orders which places p at top. We define as minimally strategy-proof a rank aggregation rule that cannot be manipulated with respect to at least one order extension. We characterize the class of minimal strategy-proof rules. Based on this characterization, we show that most rules considered in Bossert and Sprumont (2014) and Athanasoglou (2016, 2019) are not minimally strategy-proof (while being betweenness strategy-proof). This emphasizes the critical role of linearity when imposed to order extensions. Moreover, we show that a rule is strategy-proof for a rich domain of order extensions if and only if it is either constant or dictatorial, where richness requires that each ordering of a pair of orders can prevail in some hyper-order. We also discuss the existence of rules that are strategy-proof for all order extensions that satisfy the Kemeny distance criterion.
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-024-01569-4
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-024-01569-4
dc.identifier.endpage147
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.issn1432-217X
dc.identifier.issue1
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85210018449
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2
dc.identifier.startpage117
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01569-4
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/10385
dc.identifier.volume65
dc.identifier.wosWOS:001360946700001
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ3
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Science
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopus
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfare
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.snmzKA_WoS_20260402
dc.snmzKA_Scopus_20260402
dc.subjectPreference Aggregation
dc.subjectSolidarity
dc.titleMinimally strategy-proof rank aggregation
dc.typeArticle

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