Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution
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Date
2013
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer
Access Rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Abstract
This study pertains to two-sided, one-to-one matching problems and considers the best-known solution concept: the men-optimal solution. The men-optimal solution fails to satisfy consistency as well as converse consistency. Furthermore, the minimal consistent extension of the men-optimal solution equals the core. In this article, we compute the minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution as a correspondence which associates with each problem the set consisting of the men-optimal matching, and all stable and men-barterproof matchings for this problem.
Description
Keywords
Indivisible Goods, Matching Problems, Economies, Implementation, Preferences, Principle, Rules
Journal or Series
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Value
Q3
Scopus Q Value
Q1
Volume
40
Issue
1
