Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2013
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
This study pertains to two-sided, one-to-one matching problems and considers the best-known solution concept: the men-optimal solution. The men-optimal solution fails to satisfy consistency as well as converse consistency. Furthermore, the minimal consistent extension of the men-optimal solution equals the core. In this article, we compute the minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution as a correspondence which associates with each problem the set consisting of the men-optimal matching, and all stable and men-barterproof matchings for this problem.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Indivisible Goods, Matching Problems, Economies, Implementation, Preferences, Principle, Rules
Kaynak
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
40
Sayı
1
