Pass the Bucks: Credit, Blame, and the Global Competition for Investment

Basit Öğe Kaydı
dc.contributor.authorÖzdemir, Uğur
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-16T08:45:55Z
dc.date.available2021-06-16T08:45:55Z
dc.date.issued2014-09-01
dc.description.abstractBoth countries and subnational governments commonly engage in competition for mobile capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. Existing economics research has suggested that these tax incentives have a limited ability to affect investment patterns and are often excessively costly when measured against the amount of investment and jobs created. In this paper, we argue instead that the "competition" for capital can be politically beneficial to incumbent politicians. Building off work on electoral pandering, we argue that incentives allow politicians to take credit for firms' investment decisions. We test the empirical implications of this theory using a nationwide Internet survey, which employs a randomized experiment to test how voters evaluate the performance of incumbent US governors. Our findings illustrate a critical political benefit of offering such incentives. Politicians can use these incentives to take credit for investment flowing into their districts and to minimize the political fallout when investors choose to locate elsewhere. © 2013 International Studies Association.en_US
dc.fullTextLevelFull Texten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/isqu.12106en_US
dc.identifier.issn0020-8833
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84925344292en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/3782
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12106
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000342692900001en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ1en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.issue3en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.nationalInternationalen_US
dc.numberofauthors4en_US
dc.pages433 - 447en_US
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Inc.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Studies Quarterlyen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectFaith-Based Organizationsen_US
dc.subjectTimor-Lesteen_US
dc.subjectCatholicismen_US
dc.titlePass the Bucks: Credit, Blame, and the Global Competition for Investmenten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.volume58en_US

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