Board structure in listed firms: evidence from an emerging economy

dc.contributor.authorOba, Beyza
dc.contributor.authorTigrel, Elvin
dc.contributor.authorSener, Pinar
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:47:13Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:47:13Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractPurpose - This paper aims to understand the determinants of board structure of listed firms at institutional, industry and firm levels within an emerging economy. At the institutional level, the paper explores laws, managerial culture and the role of state in instituting and endorsing corporate governance practices. At the firm level, ownership patterns (family and non-family), experience in the capital markets, age and size of the firms are studied to find out the relation between these variables and the board structure. Design/methodology/approach - The research domain of the study is listed firms operating on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The data for the study are collected at two phases; at the first phase, compliance reports, annual reports, articles of association and annual shareholders' meeting reports of each firm in the sample are analyzed. At the second stage, secondary data are used for understanding the dynamics of Turkish institutional context. Findings - The results of this study reveal that boards of directors of listed Turkish firms comply with the governance practices instituted by state agencies, except on issues as independent members and committees that will influence the majority owners' control domain and private benefits. Originality/value - This paper draws attention on institutional context and argues that good governance instruments developed for Anglo-Saxon stock market-controlled business systems provide limited explanation for an emerging economy that is characterized by close cooperation between the state, family-owned businesses and financial markets. The study offers insight to policy makers at a national level, interested in developing corporate governance principles regarding boards of directors of listed firms.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1108/CG-05-2012-0044
dc.identifier.endpage+en_US
dc.identifier.issn1472-0701
dc.identifier.issn1758-6054
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84926305041en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage382en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1108/CG-05-2012-0044
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7733
dc.identifier.volume14en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000212697500007en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/Aen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherEmerald Group Publishing Ltden_US
dc.relation.ispartofCorporate Governance-The International Journal of Business in Societyen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subjectTurkeyen_US
dc.subjectBoards Of Directorsen_US
dc.subjectBoard Structureen_US
dc.subjectBoard Compositionen_US
dc.subjectEmerging Economyen_US
dc.subjectIndependent Directorsen_US
dc.subjectInvestor Protectionen_US
dc.subjectCorporate-Ownershipen_US
dc.subjectAudit Committeeen_US
dc.subjectCeo Tenureen_US
dc.subjectDeterminantsen_US
dc.subjectSizeen_US
dc.subjectPerformanceen_US
dc.subjectEntrenchmenten_US
dc.subjectOrganizationen_US
dc.titleBoard structure in listed firms: evidence from an emerging economyen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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