Approval compatible voting rules

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dc.contributor.authorTerzopoulou, Zoi
dc.contributor.authorLang, Jerome
dc.contributor.authorZwicker, William S.
dc.date.accessioned2026-04-04T18:55:21Z
dc.date.available2026-04-04T18:55:21Z
dc.date.issued2026
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi
dc.description.abstractSuppose voters are asked to submit approval ballots for a certain set of alternatives, with approval voting applied to determine a winning alternative. The same voters are then asked to report rankings over these alternatives, and some voting rule intended for ranked ballots is applied. If voters are sincere, can an approval winner possibly win this second election? Can an approval loser lose that election, or all approval co-winners be co-winners of the election? These questions give rise to three notions of approval compatibility for voting rules: positive, negative, and uniform positive approval compatibility (PAC, NAC, and UPAC). We find that NAC is a very weak notion and UPAC is a very strong one. Moreover, PAC, a stronger variant of it called OPAC, and a weaker variant of UPAC called FUPAC divide usual voting rules into four families: Condorcet-consistent rules satisfy all of them; K-approval rules for K >= 2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$K\ge 2$$\end{document} satisfy none; plurality, plurality with runoff and STV satisfy OPAC but fail FUPAC; and Borda satisfies FUPAC and PAC but fails OPAC.
dc.description.sponsorship[ANR-22-CE26-0019]
dc.description.sponsorshipWe thank Antoinette Baujard, Jean-Francois Laslier, and Remzi Sanver for helpful discussions about the meaning of approval preferences and ballots. We are also grateful to the anonymous reviewers of Social Choice and Welfare for their feedback. This research was supported in part by the project ANR-22-CE26-0019 (CITIZENS).
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-025-01588-9
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-025-01588-9
dc.identifier.endpage26
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.issn1432-217X
dc.identifier.issue1
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-105003963145
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2
dc.identifier.startpage1
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-025-01588-9
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/10386
dc.identifier.volume66
dc.identifier.wosWOS:001479052500001
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ3
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Science
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopus
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfare
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.snmzKA_WoS_20260402
dc.snmzKA_Scopus_20260402
dc.subjectConsensus
dc.subjectBorda
dc.titleApproval compatible voting rules
dc.typeArticle

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