Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2012
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We consider situations of multiple referendum: finitely many yes-or-no issues have to be socially assessed from a set of approval ballots, where voters approve as many issues as they want. Each approval ballot is extended to a complete preorder over the set of outcomes by means of a preference extension. We characterize, under a mild richness condition, the largest domain of top-consistent and separable preference extensions for which issue-wise majority voting is Pareto efficient, i.e., always yields out a Pareto-optimal outcome. Top-consistency means that voters' ballots are their unique most preferred outcome. It appears that the size of this domain becomes negligible relative to the size of the full domain as the number of issues increases.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Approval Balloting, Pareto Efficiency, Multiple Elections, Referendum, Majority Voting, Ostrogorski Paradox, Electing Committees, Separability, Preferences, Majority
Kaynak
Theory and Decision
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
72
Sayı
4
