Manilulation via endowments in university-admission problem
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2011
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Economics Bulletin
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We consider a two-sided many-to-one matching model where universities offer scholarships to students. We show that every stable matching rule is manipulable by a university via destroying endowments under a fairly wide class of scholarship rules. Furthermore, we show that the set of Nash equilibria of the destruction game and the set of stable matchings may be disjoint.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Kaynak
Economics Bulletin
WoS Q Değeri
N/A
Scopus Q Değeri
Q3
Cilt
31
Sayı
4
