Pareto-efficiency of ordinal multiwinner voting rules

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dc.contributor.authorLaine, Jean
dc.contributor.authorLang, Jerome
dc.contributor.authorOzkal-Sanver, Ipek
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M. Remzi
dc.date.accessioned2026-04-04T18:55:22Z
dc.date.available2026-04-04T18:55:22Z
dc.date.issued2025
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the Pareto-efficiency of ordinal multiwinner voting rules, that is, voting rules based on ordinal preference profiles over candidates. Defining Pareto-optimality of a committee requires relating the voters' rankings over individual candidates to their preferences over committees. We consider two well-known extension principles that extend rankings over candidates to preferences over committees: the responsive extension and the lexicographic extension. As the responsive extension outputs partial orders, we consider two Pareto-optimality notions: a committee is possibly (respectively, necessary) Pareto-optimal if it is Pareto-optimal for some (respectively, every) completion of these partial orders. As the lexicographic extension principle outputs a total order, it leads to only one Pareto-optimality notion. We then define several notions of Pareto-efficiency of multiwinner rules, depending on whether some (respectively, all) committees in the output are Pareto-optimal for one of the latter notions. We review what we believe to be a complete list of ordinal multiwinner rules that have been studied in the literature, and identify which Pareto-efficiency notions they satisfy. Our finding is that, somewhat surprisingly, these rules show a huge diversity: some satisfy the strongest notion, some do not even satisfy the weakest one, with many other rules at various intermediate levels.
dc.description.sponsorshipAgence Nationale de la Recherche [ANR-22-CE26-0019, [AI]RIE-PSAI ANR-23-IACL-0008]; BILGI Research Development Innovation Programme, POlarization viewed from SOcial choice Perspective (POSOP)
dc.description.sponsorshipWe are grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. This work was supported in part by project ANR-22-CE26-0019 Citizens and project PR[AI]RIE-PSAI ANR-23-IACL-0008, both funded by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche, as well as by the BILGI Research Development Innovation Programme, POlarization viewed from SOcial choice Perspective (POSOP).
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10058-025-00382-4
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10058-025-00382-4
dc.identifier.issn1434-4742
dc.identifier.issn1434-4750
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-105005550813
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ3
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-025-00382-4
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/10390
dc.identifier.wosWOS:001491356200001
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Science
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopus
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer Heidelberg
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Economic Design
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.snmzKA_WoS_20260402
dc.snmzKA_Scopus_20260402
dc.subjectExtension Principle
dc.subjectMulti-Winner Rules
dc.subjectCommittees
dc.subjectD71
dc.titlePareto-efficiency of ordinal multiwinner voting rules
dc.typeArticle

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