Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2021
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We consider two-tiers elections based on closed party-list proportional representation (PLPR), where party platforms involving multiple dichotomous issues are endogenously determined by their supporters' preferences (via issue-wise simple majority voting). Assuming that voters compare platforms according to the criterion of the Hamming distance and provided a high enough number of voters and issues, we show that the outcome of PLPR may be Pareto dominated by the multiple referendum outcome defined as the issue-wise majority will in the whole electorate. We refer to this situation as the PLPR paradox. We characterize the set of party platforms for which the PLPR paradox is possible. We also investigate several restrictions upon voting situations that may be sufficient for avoiding the paradox.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Proportional Representation, Majority Rule, Voting Paradox, Comparative Perspective, Incentives, Cultivate, Majority
Kaynak
Group Decision and Negotiation
WoS Q Değeri
Q2
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
30
Sayı
1
