Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems

dc.contributor.authorNizamogullari, Duygu
dc.contributor.authorOzkal-Sanver, Ipek
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:42:18Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:42:18Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we study consistent enlargement of a solution. By computing it, one actually evaluates the extent to which the solution would have to be expanded in order to be well-defined and consistent. We show that the union of stable matchings and the matching recommended by a single-valued, well-defined, individually rational, and consistent solution is a minimal consistent enlargement of the core. Although individual rationality is sufficient it is not a necessity. Next, we show that for any fixed order on the set of agents in the society, the union of stable matchings and the serial dictatorship matching is a minimal consistent enlargement of the core.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11238-014-9470-z
dc.identifier.endpage225en_US
dc.identifier.issn0040-5833
dc.identifier.issn1573-7187
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84945454979en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage217en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9470-z
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7232
dc.identifier.volume79en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000363258800003en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ3en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofTheory and Decisionen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectRoommate Problemsen_US
dc.subjectCoreen_US
dc.subjectConsistencyen_US
dc.subjectMonotonicityen_US
dc.subjectStabilityen_US
dc.titleConsistent enlargements of the core in roommate problemsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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