Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2005
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
Noting the existence of social choice problems over which no scoring rule is Maskin monotonic, we characterize minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules. We show that the minimal monotonic extension of any scoring rule has a lower and upper bound, which can be expressed in terms of alternatives with scores exceeding a certain critical score. In fact, the minimal monotonic extension of a scoring rule coincides with its lower bound if and only if the scoring rule satisfies a certain weak monotonicity condition (such as the Borda and antiplurality rule). On the other hand, the minimal monotonic extension of a scoring rule approaches its upper bound as its degree of violating weak monotonicity increases, an extreme case of which is the plurality rule with a minimal monotonic extension reaching its upper bound.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Social Choice Functions, Protective Equilibria, Respect Majority, Implementation, Elimination
Kaynak
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Değeri
Q4
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
25
Sayı
1
