Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2009
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We consider the problem of extending a (complete) order over a set to its power set. The extension axioms we consider generate orderings over sets according to their expected utilities induced by some assignment of utilities over alternatives and probability distributions over sets. The model we propose gives a general and unified exposition of expected utility consistent extensions whilst it allows to emphasize various subtleties, the effects of which seem to be underestimated - particularly in the literature on strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Preferences Over Sets, Expected Utility Consistency, Strategy-Proofness, Social Choice Functions, Manipulation, Lotteries, Rules
Kaynak
Theory and Decision
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
67
Sayı
2
