Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes

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dc.authoridDogan, Emre/0000-0003-1672-5009
dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.authorwosidDogan, Emre/L-9465-2015
dc.contributor.authorDogan, Emre
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M. Remzi
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:28Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:28Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractLet A be a set of alternatives whose power set is (A) under bar. Elements of (A) under bar are interpreted as non-resolute outcomes. We consider the aggregation of preference profiles over (A) under bar into a (social) preference over (A) under bar. In case we allow individuals to have any complete and transitive preference over (A) under bar, Arrow's impossibility theorem naturally applies. However, the Arrovian impossibility prevails, even when the set of admissible preferences over A is severely restricted. In fact, we identify a mild regularity condition which ensures the dictatoriality of a domain. Regularity is compatible with almost all standard extension axioms of the literature. Thus, we interpret our results as the strong prevalence of Arrow's impossibility theorem in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-007-0253-0
dc.identifier.endpage506en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-39349106698en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage495en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0253-0
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7121
dc.identifier.volume30en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000253351700010en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ3en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfareen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectSocial-Welfare Functionsen_US
dc.subjectRanking Opportunity Setsen_US
dc.subjectOrdinal Probabilitiesen_US
dc.subjectVoting Proceduresen_US
dc.subjectChoice Functionsen_US
dc.subjectStrategy-Proofen_US
dc.subjectMajority-Ruleen_US
dc.subjectPower Seten_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.subjectExtensionen_US
dc.titleArrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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