Is abstention an escape from Arrow's theorem?
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2007
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
In a society of variable size, Quesada (Soc Choice Welfare 25(1): 221-226, 2005) establishes the existence of Arrovian social welfare functions which are not dictatorial. We show that this escape from the Arrovian impossibility collapses when a very mild monotonicity condition is introduced.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Majority-Rule, Societies, Profiles
Kaynak
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
28
Sayı
3
