Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners

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Tarih

2003

Dergi Başlığı

Dergi ISSN

Cilt Başlığı

Yayıncı

Springer-Verlag

Erişim Hakkı

info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess

Özet

We characterize sets of alternatives which are Condorcet winners according to preferences over sets of alternatives, in terms of properties defined on preferences over alternatives. We state our results under certain preference extension axioms which, at any preference profile over alternatives, give the list of admissible preference profiles over sets of alternatives. It turns out to be that requiring from a set to be a Condorcet winner at every admissible preference profile is too demanding, even when the set of admissible preference profiles is fairly narrow. However, weakening this requirement to being a Condorcet winner at some admissible preference profile opens the door to more permissive results and we characterize these sets by using various versions of an undomination condition. Although our main results are given for a world where any two sets - whether they are of the same cardinality or not - can be compared, the case for sets of equal cardinality is also considered.

Açıklama

24th Bosphorus Workshop on Economic Design -- AUG, 2001 -- BODRUM, TURKEY

Anahtar Kelimeler

Social Choice Functions, Power Set, Correspondences, Tournaments, Kannai, Order

Kaynak

Social Choice and Welfare

WoS Q Değeri

Q3

Scopus Q Değeri

Q1

Cilt

20

Sayı

3

Künye