Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2003
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer-Verlag
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We characterize sets of alternatives which are Condorcet winners according to preferences over sets of alternatives, in terms of properties defined on preferences over alternatives. We state our results under certain preference extension axioms which, at any preference profile over alternatives, give the list of admissible preference profiles over sets of alternatives. It turns out to be that requiring from a set to be a Condorcet winner at every admissible preference profile is too demanding, even when the set of admissible preference profiles is fairly narrow. However, weakening this requirement to being a Condorcet winner at some admissible preference profile opens the door to more permissive results and we characterize these sets by using various versions of an undomination condition. Although our main results are given for a world where any two sets - whether they are of the same cardinality or not - can be compared, the case for sets of equal cardinality is also considered.
Açıklama
24th Bosphorus Workshop on Economic Design -- AUG, 2001 -- BODRUM, TURKEY
Anahtar Kelimeler
Social Choice Functions, Power Set, Correspondences, Tournaments, Kannai, Order
Kaynak
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
20
Sayı
3
