Sincerity and the Ideal of the Authentic Self: Melville's Bartleby

dc.contributor.authorTurner, Zeynep Talay
dc.date.accessioned2026-04-04T18:56:17Z
dc.date.available2026-04-04T18:56:17Z
dc.date.issued2025
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi
dc.description.abstractThe figure of Bartleby has puzzled many thinkers. Interpretations vary, but the common point in many accounts is that Bartleby is beyond any conceptualization. In this paper I will ask whether he can nevertheless be understood in terms of the problem of authenticity. I will initially follow Lionel Trilling's famous argument, that is, the ethical ideal of the authentic self had replaced an earlier one he called sincerity, and that Bartleby, being an authentic figure, can be treated as an illustration of this. Then, I will take the discussion further by examining Bartleby via Giorgio Agamben's account of ethics.
dc.identifier.issn0190-0013
dc.identifier.issn1086-329X
dc.identifier.issue1
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/10758
dc.identifier.volume49
dc.identifier.wosWOS:001530460300006
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/A
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Science
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherJohns Hopkins Univ Press
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy and Literature
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.snmzKA_WoS_20260402
dc.subject[Keyword Not Available]
dc.titleSincerity and the Ideal of the Authentic Self: Melville's Bartleby
dc.typeArticle

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