Vote Swapping in Representative Democracy

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dc.authoridDindar, Hayrullah/0000-0001-6724-2045|LAINE, Jean/0000-0002-7305-7556
dc.authorwosidDindar, Hayrullah/L-6020-2018
dc.contributor.authorDindar, Hayrullah
dc.contributor.authorLaffond, Gilbert
dc.contributor.authorLaine, Jean
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:06Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:06Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description15th International Conference on Group decision and negotiation (GDN) -- JUN 22-26, 2015 -- Warsaw, POLANDen_US
dc.description.abstractWe investigate group manipulation by vote exchange in two-tiers elections, where voters are first distributed into districts, each with one delegate. Delegates' preferences result from aggregating voters' preferences district-wise by means of some aggregation rule. Final outcomes are sets of alternatives obtained by applying a social choice function to delegate profiles. An aggregation rule together with a social choice function define a constitution. Voters' preferences over alternatives are extended to partial orders over sets by means of either the Kelly or the Fishburn extension rule. A constitution is Kelly (resp. Fishburn) swapping-proof if no group of voters can get by exchanging their preferences a jointly preferred outcome according to the Kelly (resp. Fishburn) extension. We establish sufficient conditions for swapping-proofness. We characterize Kelly and Fishburn swapping-proofness for Condorcet constitutions, where both the aggregation rule and the social choice function are based on simple majority voting. JEL Class D71, C70.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipINFORMS Sect Grp Decis & Negotiaten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-319-19515-5_18
dc.identifier.endpage239en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-319-19515-5
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-319-19514-8
dc.identifier.issn1865-1348
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84937409683en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage227en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19515-5_18
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/6978
dc.identifier.volume218en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000365186900028en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/Aen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer-Verlag Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofOutlooks and Insights on Group Decision and Negotiation, Gdn 2015en_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryKonferans Öğesi - Uluslararası - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectRepresentative Democracyen_US
dc.subjectVote Swappingen_US
dc.subjectVote Exchangeen_US
dc.subjectGroup Manipulationen_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.titleVote Swapping in Representative Democracy
dc.typeConference Object

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