The strong referendum paradox

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dc.authoridDindar, Hayrullah/0000-0001-6724-2045|LAINE, Jean/0000-0002-7305-7556
dc.authorwosidDindar, Hayrullah/L-6020-2018
dc.contributor.authorDindar, Hayrullah
dc.contributor.authorLaffond, Gilbert
dc.contributor.authorLaine, Jean
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:42:15Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:42:15Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe study a model of indirect elections where voters having weak orders as preferences over finitely many alternatives are distributed across a given set of districts. In each district preferences are aggregated into a district preference, and a voting rule selects one or several alternatives from the profile of district preferences. The referendum paradox holds at some profile and some distribution of voters across districts if the outcome of indirect elections does not coincide with the one of direct elections. We prove that whenever an indirect election procedure is separable, it is exposed to the referendum paradox if and only if it is exposed to a stronger version of the referendum paradox, where direct and indirect elections give different outcomes for any distribution of the voters across districts. We prove that many indirect elections based on a tournament solution are separable, whereas some based on a scoring rule are not. Finally, we show that all indirect elections based on a scoring rule are exposed to the strong referendum paradox.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11135-016-0361-y
dc.identifier.endpage1731en_US
dc.identifier.issn0033-5177
dc.identifier.issn1573-7845
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84973606523en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage1707en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-016-0361-y
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7211
dc.identifier.volume51en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000403575600016en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ2en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofQuality & Quantityen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectVoting Paradoxen_US
dc.subjectReferendum Paradoxen_US
dc.subjectRepresentative Democracyen_US
dc.subjectGerrymanderingen_US
dc.subjectOstrogorski Paradoxen_US
dc.subjectRepresentationen_US
dc.subjectMajorityen_US
dc.subjectPreferencesen_US
dc.titleThe strong referendum paradox
dc.typeArticle

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