Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures

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dc.authoridDindar, Hayrullah/0000-0001-6724-2045|LAINE, Jean/0000-0002-7305-7556
dc.contributor.authorDindar, Hayrullah
dc.contributor.authorLaine, Jean
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:37Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:37Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe investigate a specific type of group manipulation in two-tier elections, which involves pairs of voters agreeing to exchange their votes. Two-tier elections are modeled as a two-stage choice procedure. In the first stage, voters are distributed into districts, and district preferences result from aggregating voters' preferences district-wise through some aggregation rule. Final outcomes are obtained in the second stage by applying a social choice function that outputs one or several alternatives from the profile of district preferences. Combining an aggregation rule and a social choice function defines a constitution. Voter preferences, defined as linear orders, are extended to complete binary relations by means of some extension rule. A constitution is swap-proof w.r.t. a given extension rule if one cannot find pairs of voters who, by exchanging their preferences get better off (w.r.t. their extended preference over sets). We consider four specific extension rules: Nehring, Kelly, Fishburn, and Gardenfors. We establish sufficient conditions for the swap-proofness of a constitution w.r.t. each extension rule. Special attention is paid to majority constitutions, where both the aggregation rule and the social choice function are based on simple majority voting. We show that swap-proofness for majority constitutions pertains to a specific weakening of group strategy-proofness. Moreover, we characterize swap-proof majority constitutions w.r.t. each extension rule. Finally, we show that no constitution based on scoring methods is swap-proof.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipBILGI Research Development Innovation Programme; POlarization viewed from SOcial choice Perspective (POSOP)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipWe are indebted to two anonymous reviewers and the associate editor for their valuable comments on two previous versions of the paper. This research has been partially funded by the BILGI Research Development Innovation Programme, POlarization viewed from SOcial choice Perspective (POSOP).en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-022-01445-z
dc.identifier.endpage262en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.issn1432-217X
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85146866669en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage221en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01445-z
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7135
dc.identifier.volume61en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000920605900001en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/Aen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfareen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectStrategy-Proofnessen_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.titleVote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
dc.typeArticle

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