The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples

dc.authoridLAINE, Jean/0000-0002-7305-7556
dc.contributor.authorDogan, Onur
dc.contributor.authorLaffond, Gilbert
dc.contributor.authorLaine, Jean
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:42:46Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:42:46Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe extend the Shapley-Scarf model of markets for indivisible goods without money to the case where couples of agents have joint preferences over the set of allocations. We show that the domain of (weakly) lexicographic preferences is maximal (for inclusion) for the existence of Core allocations. This result also holds in the case where the set of agents is partitioned into non-empty coalitions with any size, as well as for the class of markets studied in Konishi et al. (2001), where individuals exchange several types of purely indivisible goods. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.002
dc.identifier.endpage67en_US
dc.identifier.issn0304-4068
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-79952699040en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage60en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.002
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7419
dc.identifier.volume47en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000288978200009en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Science Saen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Mathematical Economicsen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectJoint Preferencesen_US
dc.subjectCouplesen_US
dc.subjectCoreen_US
dc.subjectIndivisible Goodsen_US
dc.subjectIncentive Compatibilityen_US
dc.titleThe Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
dc.typeArticle

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