A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms

dc.contributor.authorNizamogullari, Duygu
dc.contributor.authorOzkal-Sanver, Ipek
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:37Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:37Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractClassical roommate problems define individual rationality by conceiving remaining single as the outside option. This conception implicitly assumes that there are always some empty rooms to be shared. However, there are many instances when this is not the case. We introduce roommate problems with a limited number of rooms, where the outside option is having no room. In this general framework, we show that the core equals the set of Pareto optimal and stable matchings.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10058-022-00297-4
dc.identifier.endpage560en_US
dc.identifier.issn1434-4742
dc.identifier.issn1434-4750
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85125731055en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage553en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00297-4
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7147
dc.identifier.volume26en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000765657400001en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Heidelbergen_US
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Economic Designen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectIndividual Rationalityen_US
dc.subjectPareto Optimalityen_US
dc.subjectCoreen_US
dc.subjectExistenceen_US
dc.subjectStabilityen_US
dc.titleA note on roommate problems with a limited number of roomsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

Dosyalar