Power in the boardroom: a study on Turkish family-owned and listed companies
dc.contributor.author | Oba, Beyza | |
dc.contributor.author | Ozsoy, Zeynep | |
dc.contributor.author | Atakan, Serap | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-18T20:47:13Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-07-18T20:47:13Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
dc.department | İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Purpose - The purpose of this study is to understand the power dynamics of the boards of directors in family-owned and listed Turkish companies. Power and dominance in the boardroom can be studied in relation to three variables: the institutional environment in which the firm is embedded; the structural configurations of the board; and the top manager's propensity to exercise his/her power resources. Focusing on the board level, this paper aims to conceptualize power dynamics as being composed of structural attributes, roles assumed, responsibilities, dependency and representation. Design/methodology/approach - The research domain of this exploratory study is family-owned and listed companies operating on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). The data for the study were collected from three different sources: a survey administered to members of the boards of directors; discourse analysis of corporate governance compliance reports of the same companies; and in- depth interviews conducted with board members. Findings - This study shows that on a typical board of directors of a family-owned and listed Turkish company, the interests of owners and managers are aligned and other stakeholders are not represented; the role of the board is confined to visibility and legitimacy and does not include control. Originality/value - This paper argues that theories developed for Anglo-Saxon equity-market based business systems have limited exploratory power for an emerging economy - namely Turkey - that is based on a business system characterized by close co-operation between the state, family-owned businesses and financial markets. | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1108/14720701011085571 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | + | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1472-0701 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1758-6054 | |
dc.identifier.issue | 5 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-78049488071 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusquality | Q1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.startpage | 603 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1108/14720701011085571 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7729 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 10 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000212668200004 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wosquality | N/A | en_US |
dc.indekslendigikaynak | Web of Science | en_US |
dc.indekslendigikaynak | Scopus | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Emerald Group Publishing Ltd | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Corporate Governance-The International Journal of Business in Society | en_US |
dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Corporate Governance | en_US |
dc.subject | Boards Of Directors | en_US |
dc.subject | Family Firms | en_US |
dc.subject | Turkey | en_US |
dc.subject | Corporate Governance | en_US |
dc.subject | Firm Performance | en_US |
dc.subject | Ceo Duality | en_US |
dc.subject | Directors | en_US |
dc.title | Power in the boardroom: a study on Turkish family-owned and listed companies | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |