Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms

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dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorÖzkal-Sanver, I
dc.contributor.authorSanver, MR
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:58:30Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:58:30Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description27th Bosphorus Workshop on Economic Design -- AUG 21-28, 2004-2005 -- Bodrum, TURKEYen_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider a two-sided matching model where agents' preferences are a function of the types of their potential mates. Matching rules are manipulated by type misrepresentation. We explore the implementability of the G-core in G-Strong Nash Equilibria. Although direct type pretension mechanisms rule out bad equilibria, the existence of equilibrium cannot be generally guaranteed. However, taking G as the discrete partition, the individually rational matching correspondence is partially implementable in Nash equilibria. On the other hand, incorporating a certain degree of hypocrisy in the mechanism, i.e., allowing agents to pretend different types to different potential mates, ensures the full implementability of the G-core in G-Strong Nash Equilibria. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.04.003
dc.identifier.endpage317en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896
dc.identifier.issn1879-3118
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-23944525039en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage304en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.04.003
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/8993
dc.identifier.volume50en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000232035800006en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Science Bven_US
dc.relation.ispartofMathematical Social Sciencesen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryKonferans Öğesi - Uluslararası - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectMatchingen_US
dc.subjectEndowmentsen_US
dc.subjectType Pretension Mechanismen_US
dc.subjectMarriage Problemsen_US
dc.titleImplementing matching rules by type pretension mechanismsen_US
dc.typeConference Objecten_US

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