An individual manipulability of positional voting rules

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Sanver 2011.pdf (1.03 MB)

Date

2011-12

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Springer Heidelberg

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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

DOI

10.1007/s13209-011-0050-y

Abstract

We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.

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Keywords

Manipulability , Positional voting rules , Multiple choice , Extended preferences

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Series-journal of the spanish economic association

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Q4

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https://hdl.handle.net/11411/3122
 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0050-y

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Faculty of Business
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess