Dindar, HayrullahLaine, Jean2024-07-182024-07-1820170165-17651873-7374https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.040https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7328Manipulation of indirect elections by vote pairing occurs when a group of voters in different electoral bodies secures a jointly preferred winner by performing pairwise exchanges of votes. We show that in elections involving a large enough number of districts, each with a large enough size, no reasonable constitution is immune to vote-pairing. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessRepresentative DemocracyVote PairingGroup ManipulationArticle2-s2.0-8504215032310.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.040107Q2105161Q4WOS:000417664400027