Sanver, M. Remzi2024-07-182024-07-1820090938-2259https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0358-4https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7110We give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is strategy-proof. In case strategy-proofness is required to hold under all tie-breaking rules, strategy-proof domains coincide with top-trivial ones where the range of the plurality rule admits at most two alternatives. This impossibility virtually prevails when strategy-proofness is weakened so as to hold under at least one tie-breaking rule: unless there are less than five voters, the top-triviality of a domain is equivalent to the (weak) non-manipulability of the plurality rule. We also characterize the cases with two, three or four voters.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessPlurality RuleStrategy-ProofnessDomain RestrictionsSocial Choice FunctionsManipulatabilityManipulationCommitteesSchemesArticle2-s2.0-6294909000510.1007/s00199-008-0358-44713Q146139Q3WOS:000264320500006