Ozyurt, SelcukSanver, M. Remzi2024-07-182024-07-1820090899-82561090-2473https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.026https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7376A social choice hyperfunction picks a non-empty set of alternatives at each admissible preference profile over sets of alternatives. We analyze the manipulability of social choice hyperfunctions. We identify a domain D-lambda of lexicographic orderings which exhibits an impossibility of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite type. Moreover, this impossibility is inherited by all well-known superdomains of D-lambda. As most of the standard extension axioms induce superdomains of D-lambda while social choice correspondences are particular social choice hyperfunctions, we are able to generalize many impossibility results in the literature. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessStrategy-ProofnessManipulationGibbard-Satterthwaite TheoremSocial Choice CorrespondencesHyperfunctionsManipulationCorrespondencesArticle2-s2.0-6734915701310.1016/j.geb.2008.09.0268922Q188066Q2WOS:000267605300032