Martin, MathieuSalles, Maurice2024-07-182024-07-1820130219-19891793-6675https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198913400124https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7928We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the nonemptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are 'ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessSocial ChoiceAggregation FunctionsVoting GamesStability SetMajorityExistenceWelfareRulesCoreArticle2-s2.0-8488116704910.1142/S02191989134001243Q415N/AWOS:000216821700003