Özkal-Sanver, I2024-07-182024-07-1820050040-58331573-7187https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-0945-9https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7225We define two versions of stability and efficiency of partitions and analyze their relationships for some matching rules. The stability and efficiency of a partition depends on the matching rule phi. The results are stated under various membership property rights axioms. It is shown that in a world where agents can freely exit from and enter coalitions, whenever the matching rule is individually rational and Pareto optimal, the set of phi-stable and phi-efficient partitions coincide and it is unique: the grand coalition. Then we define a weaker version of stability and efficiency, namely specific to a given preference profile and find some negative results for stable matching rules.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessMatchingPartitionsMembership Property RightsStabilityEfficiencyCoreArticle2-s2.0-2784449562010.1007/s11238-005-0945-92053Q219359Q4WOS:000233396000002