Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek2024-07-182024-07-1820130176-1714https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0588-4https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7124This study pertains to two-sided, one-to-one matching problems and considers the best-known solution concept: the men-optimal solution. The men-optimal solution fails to satisfy consistency as well as converse consistency. Furthermore, the minimal consistent extension of the men-optimal solution equals the core. In this article, we compute the minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution as a correspondence which associates with each problem the set consisting of the men-optimal matching, and all stable and men-barterproof matchings for this problem.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessIndivisible GoodsMatching ProblemsEconomiesImplementationPreferencesPrincipleRulesArticle2-s2.0-8487228971610.1007/s00355-011-0588-4991Q18940Q3WOS:000313479800005