Aşan, GökselSanver, Mert Remzi2021-06-142021-06-142015-030040-5833https://hdl.handle.net/11411/3749https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9430-7We consider the problem of producing an impure public good in various jurisdictions formed through the strategic decisions of agents. Our environment inherits two well-known problems: (i) Under individual decisions, there is a tension between stability and efficiency; (ii) Under coalitional decisions, stable jurisdiction structures may fail to exist. The solution, we propose is the use of membership property rights: When a move among jurisdictions is subject to the approval of the agents whom it affects, coalitionally stable jurisdiction structures coincide with those which are efficient. © 2014, Springer Science+Business Media New York.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCoalition formationImpure public goodsMembership property rightsTiebout hypothesisDecision theoryCoalition formationsMembership property rightsPublic goodsStrategic decisionsTieboutDecision support systemsArticle2-s2.0-8492529094310.1007/s11238-014-9430-7Q2WOS:000349326000008