Coban, CeyhunSanver, M. Remzi2024-07-182024-07-1820140176-17141432-217Xhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0812-0https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7127We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identified by Campbell (J Econ 12:259-272, 1976) and Baigent (J Econ 47(4):407-411, 1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (J Econ 5:478-486, 1972) type vanishes.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessArticle2-s2.0-8491196650210.1007/s00355-014-0812-09614Q195343Q3WOS:000345339100008