Nizamogullari, DuyguOzkal-Sanver, Ipek2024-07-182024-07-1820150040-58331573-7187https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9470-zhttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7232In this paper, we study consistent enlargement of a solution. By computing it, one actually evaluates the extent to which the solution would have to be expanded in order to be well-defined and consistent. We show that the union of stable matchings and the matching recommended by a single-valued, well-defined, individually rational, and consistent solution is a minimal consistent enlargement of the core. Although individual rationality is sufficient it is not a necessity. Next, we show that for any fixed order on the set of agents in the society, the union of stable matchings and the serial dictatorship matching is a minimal consistent enlargement of the core.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessRoommate ProblemsCoreConsistencyMonotonicityStabilityArticle2-s2.0-8494545497910.1007/s11238-014-9470-z2252Q221779Q3WOS:000363258800003