Ozkal-Sanver, IpekSanver, M. Remzi2024-07-182024-07-1820060176-17141432-217Xhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0101-7https://hdl.handle.net/11411/71177th International Meeting of the Society-for-Social-Choice-and-Welfare -- JUL 22-25, 2004 -- Osaka, JAPANWe consider a society confronting the decision of accepting or rejecting a list of (at least two) proposals. Assuming separability of preferences, we show the impossibility of guaranteeing Pareto optimal outcomes through anonymous referendum voting, except in the case of an odd number of voters confronting precisely two proposals. In this special case, majority voting is the only anonymous social choice rule which guarantees Pareto optimal referendum outcomes.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessConference Object2-s2.0-3394761671410.1007/s00355-006-0101-72191Q121127Q4WOS:000240438900014