Sanver, M.R.2024-07-182024-07-1820051434-4742https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0133-yhttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/6275In a public good economy where agents' preferences are known but endowments are private information, instituting an allocation rule and asking the agents their initial endowments induces an endowment-pretension game. We analyse the Nash equilibrium allocations of this game and discuss its welfare properties with reference to voluntary contributions allocations. © Springer-Verlag 2005.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessDirect İmplementationManipulationPerformance FunctionPublic GoodsVoluntary Contributions SolutionArticle2-s2.0-3364597132410.1007/s10058-005-0133-y3164Q23079