Sanver, M. Remzi2024-07-182024-07-1820090176-1714https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0352-6https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7123Defining regularity as the conjunction of unanimity, anonymity, neutrality and monotonicity, we show that every regular social choice rule can be expressed as a function of vote differences and the maximal number of canceling couples. This equivalence not only identifies the class of regular social choice rules but also allows a unified conception of various majority characterizations.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessMajority-RuleDifferenceSocietiesProfilesVotesArticle2-s2.0-6504908666910.1007/s00355-008-0352-61711Q115933Q3WOS:000265308500009