Sanver, Mehmet RemziAleskerov, FuadKarabekyan, DanielYakuba, Vyacheslav2021-01-182021-01-182011-121869-4187https://hdl.handle.net/11411/3122https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0050-yWe study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessManipulabilityPositional voting rulesMultiple choiceExtended preferencesAn individual manipulability of positional voting rulesArticle2-s2.0-8205519332510.1007/s13209-011-0050-yQ4WOS:000297543800002