Cengelci, Murat AliSanver, M. Remzi2024-07-182024-07-1820070176-1714https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0180-5https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7119In a society of variable size, Quesada (Soc Choice Welfare 25(1): 221-226, 2005) establishes the existence of Arrovian social welfare functions which are not dictatorial. We show that this escape from the Arrovian impossibility collapses when a very mild monotonicity condition is introduced.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessMajority-RuleSocietiesProfilesIs abstention an escape from Arrow's theorem?Article2-s2.0-3384741750910.1007/s00355-006-0180-54423Q143928Q3WOS:000245750400006