Ertemel, SinanKutlu, LeventSanver, M. Remzi2024-07-182024-07-1820150176-17141432-217Xhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0872-9https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7129A resolute social choice correspondence is a social choice rule which maps preference profiles into sets of mutually compatible outcomes. We consider a fairly large class of resolute social choice correspondences and characterize the strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of their voting games in terms of a generalization of the Condorcet principle. Our findings generalize those of Sertel and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 22:331-347, 2004) who address the same question in a more restricted framework.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessEffectivity FunctionsCondorcet WinnersEquilibriumManipulationSchemesArticle2-s2.0-8493752560910.1007/s00355-015-0872-92011Q118745Q3WOS:000358219600008