Nizamogullari, DuyguOzkal-Sanver, Ipek2024-07-182024-07-1820140165-48961879-3118https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.01.003https://hdl.handle.net/11411/8998In this paper, we study the core of two-sided, one-to-one matching problems. First, in a model in which agents have strict preferences over their potential mates and are allowed to remain single, we characterize the core as the unique solution that satisfies individual rationality, Pareto optimality, gender fairness, consistency, and converse consistency. Next, in a model that relaxes the constraint that agents have strict preferences over their potential mates, we show that no solution exists that satisfies Pareto optimality, anonymity, and converse consistency. In this full domain, we characterize the core by individual rationality, weak Pareto optimality, monotonicity, gender fairness, consistency, and converse consistency. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessConsistencyStabilityGamesArticle2-s2.0-8489772984410.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.01.00342Q23469Q4WOS:000336472500004